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Economic Fallout
As the U.S. nuclear weapons complex continues to shrink local governments are feeling the fiscal squeeze.



The end of the Cold War has dramatically decreased the need for continued nuclear weapons production in the United States. The communities around the largest of the weapons production and research sites owned by the Department of Energy are now facing the socioeconomic impacts caused by downsizing, mission changes, and in some cases, eventual closure of the sites. The resultant job losses reduce local incomes, property values, retail sales, and housing demand and cause other economic stresses that damages the fiscal health of some of these communities.

DOE owns some 140 sites in 38 U.S. states and territories, encompassing 2.3 million acres and containing tens of thousands of buildings and structures. This weapons complex employs more than 100,000 workers in various activities, ranging from continuing research and production at some sites to cleanup of contaminated water, soil, and buildings at other sites. Nearly all of the major weapons facilities were built in the 1940s and 1950s in locations that were relatively remote and rural, for reasons of national security. During Cold War production, communities that were supported almost totally by the nuclear weapons industry developed near the entrances to these facilities.

When a large industrial facility lays off workers, local communities often suffer economic decline.1 In general, the smaller the local community and the further removed the facility is from metropolitan areas, the larger are the anticipated effects.2 Towns and counties near U.S. nuclear weapons production sites are like company towns in their heavy reliance on DOE jobs to maintain their economies.

These communities have additional problems to confront, however. In the past they were forced to react to decisions made in secret because of security considerations.3 Moreover, because some of the communities are rural, they often lack the professional expertise and budgets required to provide services, impose controls, or interact fruitfully with a large federal bureaucracy. Closing a massive nuclear facility is also more expensive and takes more time than closing an ordinary private plant. Remedial actions will be required for several decades and prospects for private reuse are problematic at best.4

Recently, we looked at budget and employment issues facing local governments in the regions surrounding the seven largest DOE facilities: Savannah River Site in South Carolina, Hanford in Washington, Idaho National Environmental Engineering Laboratory, the Oak Ridge complex in Tennessee, Rocky Flats in Colorado, and Los Alamos and Sandia laboratories in New Mexico.5

Since the late 1980s, all of these sites, for the most part, have undergone a boom-and-bust cycle that included a build up to peak employment in the early 1990s followed by drastic reductions of employment starting in 1994. By 1996, workforce cutbacks ranged from 8.5 percent (Sandia) to 53 percent (Rocky Flats), representing tens of thousands of jobs. (See Table 1.)

Seven Major DOE Sites
Employment (1996)
% Employment Change from
peak (year)
Land Area
(sq. mi.)
DOE Budget (1994) 1994 DOE Budget as % of GRP*
Oak Ridge 16,488 -9.3 (1993) 50            $    2.3 billion 14.2
Savannah River 14,951 -31.5 (1992) 310            $    1.5 billion 16.0
Hanford 12,623 -28.6 (1994) 560            $    1.8 billion 16.0
Sandia 8,577 -8.5 (1991) 4             $  1.71 billion 8.5
Los Alamos 6,854 -16.0 (1989) 43             $    1.1 billion 25.9
Idaho 6,154 -28.2 (1991) 890             $  635 million 19.0
Rocky Flats 3,828 -53.0 (1991) 10             $  959 million 4.8
* Gross Regional Product:  regions defined by counties within 10 mile radius of site
Sources: DOE Office of Peronnel and DOE Office of Worker and Community Transition; US Bureau of Census
Major employers are important to local governments in a number of ways. For instance, they often contribute a large share of property taxes, thus reducing the residential property tax burden. Federally owned nuclear facilities, however, have never paid property taxes, although they do make modest payments to local governments in lieu of taxes. Their direct contributions to municipal revenues have therefore been minimal. Commercial nuclear power plants, on the other hand, have historically paid a huge proportion of local taxes.6

Local governments usually financed roads, sewers, schools and parks to support the nuclear facility’s employees and their families through local tax revenues and the sale of bonds, creating a long-term financial obligation for the host community.7 The regional infrastructure created as communities grew up around the nuclear facility is therefore too big to be supported solely by the rural region. When the large facility downsizes or leaves, the region needs replacement support.8

At DOE weapons sites, the loss of jobs is the biggest problem for surrounding communities. In a typical scenario, the decrease in jobs lowers the demand for housing, which causes a decline in market value of housing. This, in turn, reduces property tax revenues. Without a continued DOE presence, laid-off workers have trouble finding jobs in the area, and off-site private investment loses its economic value, leading to what economist Milton Russell calls "stranded capital" in homes, businesses, and schools built during boom times.9 Fewer paychecks also affect retail sales and personal income, causing local government revenues to drop more in those communities where a portion of sales and income tax is retained locally.

The growth prospects of weapons-site regions depend on the extent the facility spawns local suppliers or spins off new businesses.10 At most DOE sites, however, such new businesses are rare.11 Because of the rural nature of many locations chosen for weapons facilities, few suppliers are located in these regions. DOE purchases are made outside the immediate areas, and spin-off jobs are created elsewhere. Since purchasing nuclear weapons does not enhance production capacity and does not create many additional local jobs, host regions wind up paying an economic penalty.12

In addition, the high wage structure of DOE facilities may deter competing employers from locating in the area, which in turn increases the economic dependency of the region on the nuclear facility. Augusta State University economist Jurgen Brauer describes the "bifurcated labor market" in the Savannah River region and a substantially higher cost per job at Savannah River compared to nonfederal jobs in the surrounding counties.13 He suggests that two of the largest U.S. sites—Savannah River and Hanford—have actually repelled new private investment and hence job creation.

The presence of a stigma effect on past and future economic development in weapons site areas is debatable, however.14 Adjacent landowners, on the one hand, have claimed that nuclear activities diminish property values—witness, for example, lawsuits at Rocky Flats and at smaller sites in Portsmouth, Kentucky, and Fernald, Ohio. On the other hand, the lack of social and cultural amenities may be what makes these areas unattractive for business.15

Federal funds have always been used to create regional economic benefit. A good example is the construction of highways, which open up regions to development. In the case of defense-related spending, however, much of the federal investment leaves behind little usable on-site infrastructure to provide long-term economic benefit to a region. For instance, there are odd-shaped buildings, unusable waste management systems, and roads and railroads with inefficient locations.16 It is hard to convert resources for arms production to civilian uses because the technologies are significantly different and the worker skills are unique.17

The shift to environmental cleanup has provided some job-loss compensation for the large weapons-site regions like Hanford and Savannah River, but only small amounts of federal aid have been provided for long-term community economic adjustment.

This problem is not unique to the United States. Funding levels in the European Union’s KONVER program, which was established to help diversify defense-dependent regions, have also been inadequate to solve the problems they address.18 Industrial conversion, worker retraining, and community economic development are strategies put forth by those studying the issue.19

Recognizing that the changing mission of the nuclear weapons complex would result in a difficult adjustment period for regional economies, Hazel O’Leary, who was Secretary of Energy at the time, incorporated economic development as a mission of DOE in 1993. A year later, she established the Office of Worker and Community Transition (OWCT). One of the office’s objectives is to assist local communities in achieving economic independence from DOE. The office provides technical and financial assistance to community partnerships, called Community Reuse Organizations. These partnerships are designated to speak with one voice for the affected region, with the goal of establishing and implementing local economic development programs.20

The challenge is to stimulate local growth to replace jobs lost from closure or downsizing. Overall, more than 22,000 jobs were cut from the seven major DOE sites from 1994 through 1996, including more than 4,000 each at Savannah River, Hanford and Rocky Flats. According to one report, economic development assistance created 5,085 jobs to replace those that were lost during that period, although the Community Reuse Organizations took credit for only about 890 of them.21 A more recent report stated that local impact assistance led to the creation of more than 8,000 private-sector jobs at these sites. (See Table 2.)

Community Transition Funding, through FY 1997
DOE $ Allocated
DOE $ Spent

Jobs Created

Savannah River $ 43.0 million $ 12.6 million 2,117
Oak Ridge $ 40.3 million $ 33.8 million 2,901
Rocky Flats $ 30.0 million $ 28.2 million 1,187
Hanford $ 16.6 million $  7.9 million 744
Idaho $ 14.3 million $ 11.3 million 674
Los Alamos $   5.0 million $   1.4 million 510
Sandia 0 0 0
$149.2 million $ 95.2 million 8,133

DOE budgeted about $61 million for the OWCT in fiscal year 1998. About half of this budget was allocated to community assistance, with the other half going toward workforce restructuring. The amount decreased in fiscal year 1999 to about $45 million, with about $20 million available for community assistance. Two projects will exhaust a little over half of the $20 million: one is an appropriation to the state of Idaho as part of a legal settlement, and the other is a commitment to accelerate reuse of the Mound facility in Miamisburg, Ohio. This leaves less than $10 million to fund community assistance at all other sites, including the heavily affected Savannah River and Hanford regions.22

The community transition efforts thus far are inadequate, and the cleanup funds being distributed to the sites have become a substitute for adjustment to a post-DOE world. Continued dependence on cleanup jobs at the sites rather than transitioning to a non-DOE economy will exact a toll on long-term economic sustainability. Milton Russell, at the University of Tennessee, recommends the creation of a separate governing body, with its own mandate and its own funding, to deal with community impacts.23 This organization would promote economic vitality in the regions by focusing on each community’s particular needs—for example, worker retraining, public school improvements, and federal buy-out of local debt.

To get a better picture of the economic and fiscal impacts of downsizing, change in mission, and closure of DOE weapons sites on the surrounding communities, we surveyed 26 local treasurers, comptrollers, and chief financial officers in towns and counties near the major facilities. According to earlier economic studies, such communities are the places that have received the largest economic benefits—as measured by jobs and personal income—from the presence of the facilities, so they could be expected to be the places with the most severe economic impacts.24

Initially, we asked what were the most important fiscal impacts of the DOE sites on the region. Nearly half of the responding towns and counties reported that DOE provides some type of direct payment to them. Those reporting financial support were primarily the host counties who receive payment in lieu of taxes for the land that was taken for the site, or places like the City of Broomfield near Rocky Flats, where DOE provided $56 million to fund a special capital project to replace the water supply.

The $40,000 in-lieu-of-taxes allotment that DOE pays to Butte County, Idaho, for instance, amounts to about 11 cents per acre of land the Idaho Lab occupies in the county. The fiscal official there lamented that the lack of impact fees from DOE limit the county’s revenue base. Even in Los Alamos, the official there referred to the lab as a billion dollar industry that is virtually tax exempt. The fiscal official from Westminster, Colorado, near Rocky Flats, commented that the city does not receive DOE money to pay for local government staff to oversee Rocky Flats activities that affect surrounding land use and water quality. This staff time takes away from work needed to meet the city’s routine operations. The absence of adequate levels of direct payments from DOE to local governments is a pervasive issue that has fueled resentment at the major sites.

Effects on employment levels are the most frequently cited as major impacts. Jobs are the number-one concern among residents living near nuclear weapons facilities. Even though all of these sites have dangerous radioactive materials and the potential for, if not a history of, public health threats, concern over the loss of jobs rated even higher than the concern for site contamination.

Only 15 percent of the respondents said the facility had little or no effect on employment. Nearly half said that employment had dropped precipitously. Others reported employment decreases or a roller coaster of increases and decreases. Because DOE dollars account for a large percentage of local income, reductions in these dollars, as one official put it, may be "good for the U.S. economy but they hurt the local economy."

Employment losses have caused property values to drop near Savannah River, Hanford, Rocky Flats, and Oak Ridge. In fact, loss in property value was the second largest fiscal effect caused by the shrinking of the nuclear weapons complex. The only place to report that a DOE site actually increased property values greatly was Bernalillo County, New Mexico, host county to Sandia Lab. Sandia has experienced the least layoffs, and well-paid scientists and engineers continue to create a demand for high-priced housing. A similar effect occurs at Los Alamos, where high property values make affordable housing for nonlab jobs virtually unavailable.

Compared to employment and property values, fewer officials said that other secondary effects from layoffs—such as impacts on debt, tax rates, school enrollment, and social services—were substantial. But if effects were noted, they were almost always economically bad. A comment from a fiscal official in one of the cities near Hanford summed up the interaction of these effects well:

Hanford hired 5,000 employees then turned around and laid off 5,800. We built a new $29 million high school to deal with the build up—now we pay for it during the downsizing. We have a property tax base that is 74 percent residential. What happens when the largest employer lays off 25 percent of its workforce!

The picture that emerges is that fluctuating employment levels cause fiscal strains on local governments faced with building homes and schools in the good times and paying for them in the bad times.

A second major concern of communities in the neighborhood of nuclear weapons sites is whether they have adequate regional economic strength or attractiveness to handle impacts of downsizing. The answer in most cases is no. A comment from an official near the Hanford site is typical: "The federal presence this 50 some years has done little to provide any long-term legacy in our community—no industry or no infrastructure that will outlive the site."

Stronger and more diversified economies in the greater Denver, Knoxville, and Albuquerque regions will help Rocky Flats, Oak Ridge, and Sandia, respectively, to bounce back much better from dependence on military facilities. The constraints to growth at Los Alamos are not as much related to lack of infrastructure and amenities as to lack of available space and few connections to Santa Fe. Los Alamos, which is located on a relatively small section of plateau, occupies most of the available land, leaving little physical space to expand or diversify the economy.

The economic legacy of downsizing and closure hits hardest in those regions such as Savannah River, Hanford, Idaho, and Los Alamos that are more remote and have few amenities to entice other business to stimulate their economies. Another detractor is the wage effect; contractors and other employers cannot match DOE’s high wages. Notably, very few respondents believed that a nuclear stigma per se deters growth.

The economic legacy of the nuclear weapons sites takes different forms in each of the regions, but a common thread is that while dependence on a large number of high-paying jobs from a single employer for 50 years has supported these economies, it has also stunted long-term growth.

Finally, we turn to the question about what future uses are most suitable to help ease the fiscal and economic impacts on communities near a downsizing or closing DOE facility. Most respondents, think the lands should be retained for industrial or nuclear use. This is probably because community leaders see these uses as the best ways to retain more jobs directly at the site.

Communities around Rocky Flats, however, which were also the only places to prefer complete closure of the site, do not want future nuclear uses. One of the big municipal impacts from Rocky Flats is the threat the nuclear facility poses to drinking water supplies. Removing nuclear and hazardous materials and closing the site therefore are probably in the community’s best interest, both economically and for public health. Moreover, nearby communities, like Boulder, are anxious to designate the site as open space to limit growth and development.

Jobs are too important in the other major site-regions to let go of the sites’ missions entirely. Waste management, parks and reserves, commercial uses, and recreation—in that order—are the preferred uses in those areas. Residential and agricultural uses are not widely preferred for the sites, partly because most of the regions do need additional land for these purposes and partly because leftover contamination renders the land unfit, or at least unappealing, for these uses. Regardless of the future use, however, many communities would like to see lands shift back into private ownership and be put back on the local tax rolls following decommissioning.

Although some efforts are being made, more undoubtedly could be done to alleviate economic stresses in these communities and help them prepare for a lessened DOE presence. And even if DOE chose not to offer more financial support, it could help immeasurably by communicating in a forthright manner about future plans, working directly with local governments, and committing itself to future plans, whatever they may be. Our survey showed that only rarely are local leaders invited to contribute to site future use decisions, though most want to be involved.

Just as the building of the nuclear weapons complex fueled regional economies across the United States, now the ceasing of weapons production has caused these same regions to feel the sting of job losses and negative ripple effects in the local economy.

Most of the secondary and tertiary impacts of job reductions are hitting hardest in the rural regions least equipped to respond to them. Similar impacts occurred with the restructuring of the defense industry and military downsizing worldwide, where the more remote regions faced a tougher transition than regions close to more urbanized areas.

Each DOE site region will respond differently to site downsizing, and each will face a unique set of issues in managing the community transition. For instance, some rural regions that have relatively shallow and leaky economies—that is, their investment dollars tend to end up outside the region—are less able to produce jobs from investment dollars, so a greater effort and a different type of assistance will be required there than in the more urbanized areas.

Economic assistance programs cannot be monolithic. After 50 years of doing business behind closed doors rather than actively listening to community officials, DOE cannot rely on a one-size-fits-all approach. Such an approach may be suitable for managing technical operations but will not work for site-specific economic development activities that require community involvement. Citizens and local officials at different sites have very different messages to convey, which poses a great challenge to DOE since it has little organizational experience in listening to stakeholders.

DOE should feel obligated to mitigate impacts on communities that have supported its operations over the years. A private firm can shut its doors and leave a community to fend for itself, but most people would agree that as a federal department, DOE should take some action to cushion negative effects of its decisions. There is precedent for this in other regions dominated by federal dollars; military bases and national forests are good examples.

Certainly, DOE is not the only contributor to the economic plights of these regions, and DOE cannot and should not correct every area of deficiency. Nevertheless, political pressures will continue for increased assistance to these regions, even if DOE could ignore its moral obligation. At a minimum, DOE’s acknowledgment of its fiscal impacts, forthright communication with the affected local and county governments about future plans, and a sincere effort to honor those plans would be a necessary and welcome step toward helping these communities manage their own destinies in the post-Cold War world.n



The Oak Ridge Reservation, located in the city of Oak Ridge in eastern Tennessee, includes three major DOE installations: K-25, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Y-12. The site makes up over 60 percent of the total land area within the city limits. The reservation dates to the early 1940s and has had numerous research and production functions in its history, including production of highly enriched uranium, chemical separations, and weapons development

The Savannah River Site is located in southcentral South Carolina along the border with Georgia. The nearest population centers are Augusta, Georgia, 15 miles to the northwest and Aiken, South Carolina, about 10 miles to the north. The site was established in 1950 to produce special radioactive isotopes using its five nuclear reactors and chemical separations facilities. The mission at Savannah River has shifted from production to environmental management, with activities concentrating on materials stabilization, deactivation of facilities, environmental restoration, and waste management.

The Hanford Site is located along the Columbia River in southcentral Washington state. Three cities with combined population of about 100,000 lie to the south and southeast of the site: Richland, Kennewick, and Pasco. The large, remote site produced plutonium and fabricated and processed fuel from the 1940s through the 1980s, when the production mission was replaced with an environmental management mission. Only about 6 percent of the massive site has been actively used, and current and future activities at the site will include stabilization of nuclear materials and deactivation and decommissioning of facilities.

Sandia National Laboratory, located six miles east of Albuquerque, New Mexico, is housed within the boundaries of Kirtland Air Force Base. Sandia’s missions include nuclear weapons research, biomedical engineering, and advanced technology development. It is much smaller in size than the other major sites, but its 8,000 employees make it an important part of the overall regional economy.

Los Alamos National Laboratory is in Los Alamos County, about 25 miles northwest of Santa Fe, New Mexico. Adjacent towns are Los Alamos to the north and White Rock to the east. Like most of the other major sites, it was established in the early 1940s to design, develop, and test nuclear weapons. It has also processed nuclear materials and produced nuclear components. Like Sandia, it has an ongoing research and development mission, but it also has numerous contaminated areas that require stabilization and cleanup.

Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory lies on 890 square miles in parts of five counties in southern Idaho, about 30 miles west of Idaho Falls. Like Savannah River, Hanford, and Oak Ridge, the facility has been engaged in various stages of nuclear materials production and chemical processing, creating large quantities of high- and low-level radioactive wastes that now require massive cleanup. About 90 percent of the land is undeveloped, and hunting and grazing are allowed.

The Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site occupies about 10 square miles in Jefferson County, Colorado, about 15 miles northwest of downtown Denver. Although the immediate area is sparsely populated, the larger metropolitan area is growing rapidly, with over 2 million people within a 50-mile radius. The primary facilities, which were used to produce weapons components, are located in the industrial core area, and the remaining 90 percent of the site serves as a buffer zone. Environmental management activities are the primary mission and, unlike the other sites, Rocky Flats has been designated for fast-track cleanup and closure within the next 10 to 15 years.n KL, MG, & MF

Karen Lowrie, Michael Greenberg, Michael Frisch are post-doctoral associate, professor, and doctoral candidate, respectively, at Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy, Rutgers University, in New Brunswick, New Jersey.25

1. US Department of Labor, "Responses to Defense Cutbacks: Demonstration Evaluation Findings," Research and Evaluation Report Series 97-A (Berkeley Planning Associates: Oakland, CA, 1997); S. Groves and M. Valente, Evaluating Financial Condition: A Handbook for Local Government (Washington, DC: ICMA, 1994).

2. National Research Council, Social and Economic Aspects of Radioactive Waste Disposal (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1984); Milton Russell, "Toward a Productive Divorce: Separating DOE Cleanups from Transition Assistance" (Knoxville, TN: Joint Institute for Energy and Environment, 1997).

3. T. Allison, F. Calzonetti, and S. Hunter, "Analysis of the Formation, Expression and Economic Impacts of Risk Perceptions Associated with Nuclear Facilities" (Argonne, IL: Argonne National Lab, 1993).

4. Zenia Kotval and J.R. Mullin, "The Closing of the Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Plant: The Impact on a New England Community," Journal of the American Planning Association 63 (Autumn 1997), pp. 454-468.

5. Although the Nevada Test Site is the largest DOE site in land area, we do not include it in our study because its budget is relatively small, and employment that peaked over 8,000 has dropped off gradually since the mid-1980s. The same employment trend occurred at a very small site in Kansas City that employed about 7,000 at its peak. We exclude Lawrence Livermore because it has suffered only a moderate decline since 1991, and employment was relatively constant at about 8,000 before that time.

6. Michael Greenberg et al., "Local growth near nuclear power stations in the United States," Town and Planning Review 57 (1986), pp. 225-238.

7. William J. Weida, "Substituting Employment in Cleaning up the Environment of Defense Facilities for Jobs Lost through Disarmament," in Jurgen Brauer and M. Chatterji, eds. Economic Issues of Disarmament (New York: New York University Press, 1993), pp. 179-192.

8. Ibid., p. 183.

9. Russell, "Toward a Productive Divorce."

10. Ann Markusen, "Sticky Places in Slippery Space: A Typology of Industrial Districts," Economic Geography 72 (1996), pp. 293-313.

11. T. Allison, F. Calzonetti, and S. Hunter, "The Formation and Economic Impact of Perceptions of Risk Surrounding Nuclear Facilities" (Argonne, IL: Argonne National Lab, 1993).

12. William Weida, "The Economic Implications of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence," in Stephen Schwartz, Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), pp. 519-543.

13. Jurgen Brauer, "Do Militaary Expenditures Create Net Employment? The Case of U.S. Military-nuclear Production Sites," in Jurgen Brauer and William Gissy, eds., Economics of Conflict and Peace (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1997), pp. 201-226.

14. William C. Metz, "Historical Application of a Social Amplification of Risk Model: Economic Impacts of Risk Events at Nuclear Weapons Facilities," Risk Analysis 16 (1996), pp. 185-193; Allison et al. "The Formation" (1993); P. Slovic et al., "Perceived Risk, Stigma, and Potential Economic Impacts of a High-level Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada," Risk Analysis 11 (4) (1991), pp. 683-695.

15. T. Allison and F. Calzonetti, "How Significant is Perceived Environmental Risk to Business Location Decisions?" (Argonne, IL: Argonne National Lab, 1996).

16. E.L. Gertcher and W.J. Weida, Beyond Deterrence: The Political Economy of Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).

17. Ann Markusen, "Structural Barriers to Converting the US Economy," in Jurgen Brauer and M. Chatterji, eds. Economic Issues of Disarmament (New York: New York University Press, 1993), pp. 111-136; Weida, "The Economic Implications of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence."

18. Bonn International Center for Conversion, Conversion Survey 1996: Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and Demobilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 137.

19. Lloyd J. Dumas, "Finding the Future: The Role of Economic Conversion in Shaping the Twenty-first Century," in Lloyd Dumas, ed., The Socioeconomics of Conversion from War to Peace (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 3-22.; Ann Markusen and Joel Yudken, Dismantling the Cold War Economy (New York: Basic Books, 1992).

20. OECI Clearinghouse, "Department of Energy Economic Development Program: Initiatives and Accomplishments" < > (1997).

21. Karin Schill, "Fed Money Creates Few Jobs," Augusta Chronicle (April 13, 1997), p. C1.

22. US Department of Energy, Office of Worker and Community Transition, "FY 1999 Congressional Budget Request" (1998).

23. Russell, "Toward a Productive Divorce."

24. Michael Greenberg et al., "Bombs and Butterflies: A Case Study of the Challenge of Post Cold War Environmental Planning and Management for United States Nuclear Weapons Sites," Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 40 (1997), pp. 739-750.

25. The authors would like to thank Veena Singh for her assistance in data collection. They also want to thank Bernard Goldstein, Charles Powers, Jack Moore, Arthur Upton, and other colleagues for encouraging this work. The Consortium for Risk Evaluation and Stakeholder Participation funded the research through a cooperative agreement with DOE. The viewpoints expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of DOE, its contractors, or any other members of the consortium.

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