Environmental Aftermath in Kosovo
An inspection of post-conflict Yugoslavia reveals underlying environmental problems that need attention.
During the 1999 NATO bombing campaign of Yugoslavia, conflicting reports emerged in the media concerning environmental damages from the campaign. Of particular concern were the releases of oils and chemicals from targeted industrial sites, the possibility of hazardous substances entering the Danube River, and the use of weapons containing depleted uranium.
On March 19, 1999, a peace agreement between the federal government of Yugoslavia and the ethnic Albanian minority in Kosovo was negotiated in Rambouillet but not signed by the Yugoslavian government. On March 24, a day after U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke returned from Yugoslavia, having failed to persuade the government to agree with the Rambouillet accords, NATO started Operation Allied Force and began to bomb targets all over Yugoslavia.
On June 1, after 78 days and after dropping more than 14,000 bombs, NATO suspended Operation Allied Force. The Yugoslavian government agreed to an unconditional withdrawal from Kosovo, and the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1244, which entrusts the establishment of an international civil administration in Kosovo to the UN Secretary General.
The Yugoslavian government claimed that the bombings had caused severe environmental damage and were intended to inflict damage that would affect human health and natural resources. NATO, on the other hand, claimed that its use of sophisticated, state-of-the-art weapons against carefully selected targets had minimized environmental and other secondary damage.
Task Force Responds
A UN Interagency Needs Assessment Mission visited Yugoslavia for 12
days in May 1999 to make an initial assessment of the consequences of
the conflict even as the bombings and ethnic cleansing continued. Immediately
after the UN interagency mission reported its findings, Klaus Topfer,
the executive director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
and acting executive director of United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
(Habitat), created the Balkans Task Force to make a detailed assessment
of the impact the conflict had on the environment and human settlements.
Pekka Haavisto, Finland's former Minister of Environment and International
Development Cooperation agreed to chair the task force. The Balkans
Task Force comprises staff from UNEP, Habitat, and independent environmental
experts. This provided a rare opportunity for the United Nations to
examine the effects of modern warfare on the environment.
In July 1999, after the conflict ended, the task force's core team prepared for a detailed desk study followed by field missions. During the desk study, all available data were compiled and studied, including information from the media, UN and non-UN agencies, NATO, governments including that of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and nongovernmental agencies. A comprehensive database was set up to collect and compare all information available regarding the environmental damage caused by the bombings.1
Dilemmas
The Balkans Task Force chairman, Pekka Haavisto, began the report with
the statement that the most endangered resource in times of war is the
truth. It was clear from the start that the task force assessment was
made in a highly charged political climate; however, the task force
aimed to be as objective and scientific as possible. The first priority
was to identify potential pitfalls as the task force walked a fine line
between conflicting information.
n Was the information accurate? The Balkans Task Force team got mixed information from the pre-mission desk study as well as during the field missions. Data released by the media — from radio, television, magazines, press releases, and other magazine sources — about quantities of specific pollutants differed considerably, and experts interviewed by the task force at times had completely different opinions. Some experts, for example, stated that if depleted uranium had been used in the bombs, it would not pose any threat to human health, since such radiation is very low, below natural background radiation levels. Others maintained that bombs containing depleted uranium were widely used in Kosovo, and that many people, especially those living close to bombing sites, were exposed to high levels of radiation from inhaling radioactive particles.
n Which sites should the task force visit? Since the Balkans Task Force could not visit all bombed sites, it had to select a representative sample to draw general conclusions. In addition, since the task force intended to visit the sites widely reported in the media as the most polluted, the core team had already started to collect information on these sites in an extensive database. This database allowed the task force to get a clear idea on conditions at the most relevant sites and allowed the field teams to look for specific pollution expected to be present at certain sites. The task force used information from the database, the findings of the investigative preliminary mission, and information from the Yugoslavian government to determine which sites to visit.
n How accurate was the bombing? Official information from NATO press releases, which were aired on television around the world, showed very accurate bombing of targeted areas. NATO claims that their accuracy in bombing resulted in minimal damage to human health, the environment, and cultural and historically important sites and buildings. The Yugoslavian government, however, claimed that many bombs had missed their targets and as a result many innocent civilians died. In addition, they claimed that some targets were purposefully hit to cause environmental pollution with resulting threats to human health. While Yugoslavian sources characterized air bombings of targets in national natural parks as outright targeting of natural heritage sites, NATO stated that only military and strategic sites, especially hilltop telecommunications towers, had been targeted within protected areas.
n What damage was due to the conflict? It was difficult, and in some cases impossible, to distinguish between environmental pollution caused by the bombings and the pollution existing before the conflict. From an environmental point of view, this distinction is not very relevant. Indeed, if a river is polluted, the cause of the pollution doesn't matter much in view of the need for remediation. More important are the effects and possible remedial measures. Still, the objective of the task force was to determine the effects of the Kosovo conflict on the environment, and therefore the distinction between old and conflict-related pollution was relevant.
n Is aid considered humanitarian assistance or reconstruction? While support for reconstruction, including the rebuilding of houses, offices, and infrastructure such as bridges, roads, and railroads is not allowed under the present embargo, humanitarian aid is allowed. For example, with the cold winter approaching, the European Union recently donated diesel fuel to some Yugoslavian cities for heating purposes. One of the main questions for the task force was whether support for environmental protection could be considered humanitarian aid.
Findings
After thorough background information was gathered, the first mission
went into Yugoslavia on July 19, seven weeks after the bombings had
ended, to visit industrial sites. While international support organizations
were entering Kosovo in massive numbers, because of the political climate
and the embargo, few such agencies were present in other provinces of
Yugoslavia immediately after the conflict. The task force received a
great deal of media attention, and all major networks were present when
the team entered the first site in Yugoslavia: Pancevo, a town with
a population of more than 100,000 near Belgrade. Pancevo, which boasts
a large petrochemical industry including an oil refinery, plastics manufacturing,
and a fertilizer plant, was a target of NATO bombing in April.
Industrial Sites
Some sites were completely destroyed, such as the oil refinery in Novi
Sad, a city of 300,000 on the Danube River. Others were heavily damaged,
such as the industries in Pancevo, or experienced relatively little
damage, such as the plastics factory in Pristina. No matter the amount
of damage involved, it was clear that NATO had been precise in its bombings;
for example, one of the targets was the fertilizer factory in Pancevo,
which was hit during one of the first days of the NATO campaign.
This fertilizer plant covers a big plot of land. During its first attack, NATO destroyed a small, unmanned pumping station used to heat and subsequently pump diesel around the site. Diesel fuel used to generate electricity was essential to run the factory, and the bomb that destroyed the pumping house brought the whole plant to a standstill.
At other sites the NATO strategy was to destroy the complete installation. For example, in Novi Sad, cluster bombs were used to completely destroy the oil refinery, including the storage tanks. More than two-thirds of the 150 tanks were directly hit or seriously damaged during at least 12 NATO air strikes between April 5 and June 9.
Major human health threats and possible environmental pollution were prevented by swift, and often very risky, action of local staff. For example, after the initial attack at the Pancevo fertilizer plant, some processing units were restarted and a tank full of highly explosive liquid ammonia was rapidly processed into fertilizer. The factory staff worked day and night to use up the ammonia. A couple of days later the fertilizer plant was attacked again, and a bomb missed the ammonia storage tank by a few meters. Pieces of the bomb damaged the tank, but a large explosion was averted because the factory had managed to empty the tank.
At almost all oil storage facilities the task force visited, such as Prahovo, Pristina and Kraljevo, it was clear that most of the tanks were empty, or almost empty, when hit. Often staff at factories and storage facilities worked around the clock to remove oil and other valuable substances before the installations were bombed. Not only was the oil removed and set aside for military purposes, people also risked their lives to move dangerous substances away from potential NATO targets to protect human health and the environment.
The bombing did, however, cause the release of many hazardous substances, and serious but localized environmental problems were found at the industrial sites in Pancevo. For example, mercury and a chlorine substance, ethylene dichloride, had leaked onto the ground and into the industrial canal, and burning oil and other substances resulted in severe air pollution. At the Zastava car factory in the town of Kragujevac, high levels of PCBs leaked from damaged power transformers. At an oil refinery in Novi Sad, leaking oil resulted in possible groundwater pollution. In the city of Bor, sulfur dioxide emissions from a bombed copper plant created severe air pollution; large amounts of sulfur dioxide were still being emitted in the air when the task force visited the site.
However, the conflict itself was not the only environmental concern. The task force found that many factories had no idea what to do with hazardous wastes before, during, or after the conflict. Many factories had waste stored from before the conflict, and some had no environmental strategies or procedures in place to minimize or process these hazardous wastes.
The Blue Danube
One of the principal environmental concerns highlighted by the media
and nongovernmental organizations has been possible damage to the Danube
River. Since most of the key industrial facilities targeted during the
air strikes were located along the river or along its tributaries, there
were fears that large quantities of hazardous substances had entered
the Danube, affecting not only Yugoslavia but also countries downstream.
The Danube, which flows hundreds of miles through Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria and empties into the Black Sea, is used for many purposes. It provides drinking water for millions of people, is used for agricultural irrigation, and is a commercial and recreational fishing resource. All these uses could be threatened by contaminants from the bombing.
Based on the water sampling, the field mission concluded that there was no evidence of an ecological catastrophe. As in its mission to industrial sites, the task force found some hot spots, or locally polluted sites, but no full-scale environmental disaster.
Some hot spots are a direct threat to human health and environment — for example, the Pancevo canal, a humanmade canal connected to the Pancevo industrial wastewater treatment plant. The water in this canal was heavily polluted during the bombings. The Yugoslavian authorities have temporarily closed off the canal from the Danube, but sooner or later production will start again and the canal will have to be opened. This canal is so polluted it needs to be cleaned completely, a process that includes total remediation of all the sediment on the bottom, a very expensive undertaking.
Until now, Yugoslavia has not participated in international networks for water quality monitoring, pollution reduction, and emergency response. Nor is it part of the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River or the Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River, also known as the Danube River Protection Convention. To address environmental concerns that predated the Kosovo crisis, as well as to help in cleanup after the fact, the task force recommends that Yugoslavia be integrated into existing international environmental agreements to protect the Danube.
Natural Areas
The Balkan region is exceptionally valuable for the conservation of
biological diversity in Europe, and the territory of Yugoslavia is certainly
an important component of the overall richness of the Balkan's natural
resources.
The Yugoslavian government claimed that "damage inflicted to ecosystems and habitats of endangered species [in Kopaonik National Park] was irreparable."2 When a Balkans Task Force mission visited the protected areas in Yugoslavia, however, it found significant physical damage from the air strikes within limited areas, but this was relatively minor considering the overall size and function of the protected areas and ecosystems.3 However, there is still much unexploded ordnance, an immediate safety issue, which might obstruct recreational use, including tourism, in the long term.
Depleted Uranium
One of the greatest concerns, which received a great deal of media attention,
was the use of weapons containing depleted uranium. Depleted uranium
is a waste product from nuclear reactors. It is extremely dense and
is used in the tips of certain ammunition designed to have maximum penetration.
It is used in bullets for penetrating armor, but can also be used in
cruise missiles. As a waste product, depleted uranium is available in
huge quantities and is relatively cheap.
Despite several attempts, the Balkans Task Force could not obtain official data on where or how much depleted uranium was used, either from NATO and its member states or from Yugoslavian authorities.4 Therefore, this part of the study was carried out through a written assessment only.
The study group consisted of experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the World Health Organization, the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute, and the United Nations Environment Programme.
The task force did undertake a small mission to Kosovo, taking basic measurements of radioactivity from random bombing sites. The team's preliminary conclusions are that the risks were restricted to the limited area around a target hit with weaponry containing depleted uranium. People who were in close proximity when a target was hit with depleted uranium weapons may have inhaled dangerous levels of depleted uranium.
Challenges Ahead
The task force found that the Kosovo conflict has not caused an environmental
catastrophe in the Balkan region nor an environmental disaster countrywide
in Yugoslavia. However, at some specific local sites, mainly hot spots
at industrial sites, high levels of pollutants were found that posed
a serious threat to human health and the environment.
The task force also found high background concentrations of pollutants at most sites, as well as in the Danube, an indication that most of the pollution clearly predates the Kosovo conflict. Since these sites lacked environmental strategies to safely store, handle, and treat solid waste during normal operations, much less in a natural disaster or in time of war, improvements in environmental management capabilities are needed. The hot spots identified require immediate attention if further damage to human health and the environment is to be avoided. If no action is taken, the pollution could easily spread and increase the scope of the problem significantly.
From the outset, the task force understood the difficulty of its mission to find reliable information, choose representative sites to visit, determine the accuracy of the bombing, decide the source of environmental damage, and determine the necessity for humanitarian aid. With some degree of certainty, the task force members are confident they obtained an accurate assessment of the environmental damage.
First, there was no reason for Yugoslavia to hide any environmental damage; after all, it was in Yugoslavia's interest to reveal the damage done by the bombings. Second, throughout its assessment, the task force was not denied access to any nonmilitary site. Third, the task force visited all the sites that the media reported as heavily bombed, such as Pancevo and Novi Sad.
On the other hand, during the task force's travels through Yugoslavia, we noticed many industrial sites that were bombed but which we did not visit. Transformers and chemicals could have leaked at any industrial site bombed. For example, the industrial city of Nis, the second largest city in Yugoslavia, was so severely bombed that citizens reported taking shelter in cellars for most of the nights during the conflict, sometimes tens of nights in a row.5 When driving through the city, the task force observed, but did not visit, the sites of several destroyed chemical industries. What possible environmental problems might be found at those and other sites not visited by the task force? There were also reports that the water of the river Nis, which flows through the city, was heavily polluted during the conflict by industrial releases.6 For a more complete picture of the damages, more sites, especially industrial sites, should be visited.
The task force was denied access to any military sites. Since those seemed most heavily bombed, there may be unreported environmental damage at those sites.7 But in general, the core team is confident that it visited the most polluted sites and that its conclusions are fairly representative of the overall picture of the environmental damage from the conflict.
As for the accuracy of NATO bombings, the task force findings confirm the television images: the bombings were frighteningly accurate. However, we did see some evidence of missed targets and unexploded ordnance.
The task force also found significant levels of background pollution in most places they visited — for example in the Danube water, in the sediment of the Danube, in the soil at industrial sites, and in the groundwater. Sophisticated analyses allowed the laboratories to determine the fingerprints of the pollutants; old oil leaks show up differently in laboratory reports than new oil spills. For example, in the vicinity of one of the bombing sites, the task force found PCBs that were different from those released at the bombed site, proving that the PCBs found in the vicinity were spilled before the conflict.
In addition, some pollution was caused indirectly by the conflict. For example, at a huge copper mine in Bor, power transformers were bombed and destroyed during the conflict. Because of the lack of electricity, the filter that separates sulfur dioxide from waste gases has been switched off and the copper mine now emits huge amounts of sulphur dioxide into the air. Task force team members visiting Bor developed sore throats and stinging eyes soon after arriving at the site. Since Bor is situated close to the Bulgarian border, part of this air pollution is going into Bulgaria.
Some major bridges over the Danube have also been bombed, including a very important bridge at Novi Sad, a major transportation crossroads. The bridge is broken in two with the halves hanging into the water on either side of the Danube. Under the terms of the embargo, which forbids support for infrastructure reconstruction, money to repair the bridge is not allowed. As winter sets in, the surface of the Danube will freeze. Since the Danube has a strong current, ice will be carried downstream, and some predict the ice will get stuck at the bridges, blocking the flow of water and causing major flooding in the city. Is help to remove the bridges and prevent such floods humanitarian aid?
Cleaner Future
The United Nations Environment Programme is now trying to find financial
backing for remediation efforts at the worst polluted sites and is trying
to convince donors that pollution in Yugoslavia and Kosovo needs to
be addressed urgently, especially in Pancevo, Novi Sad, Bor, and Kragujevac.
The international community, it now seems, is willing to regard this
type of support as humanitarian assistance.
Since UNEP is a policy agency that is more catalyst than actor, it does not execute field projects. However, UNEP and the United Nations Development Programme, have joined forces and submitted a joint proposal to solicit donor funding for cleaning up the worst hit sites.8 This proposal asks for US$ 17 million to clean up the worst polluted sites, the hot spots identified by the Balkans Task Force.
NATO's military strategy relied on weakening the enemy through destroying carefully selected targets rather than inflicting mass human casualties. As not only military but also other targets were bombed, this resulted in serious environmental and human health problems at selected, mainly industrial, sites. But the task force also found that many of Yugoslavia's environmental problems precede the conflict. The international community needs to help the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia join international environmental efforts that will benefit the whole Balkan region as well as to address the site-specific damages that occurred in Yugoslavia during the conflict.n
Rob de Jong is special assistant to the UNEP director of the Division of Policy Development and Law, based at UNEP headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya. He was part of the Balkans Task Force team and participated in the industrial mission and drafting of the report.
NOTES
1. The task force also
conducted an assessment of human settlements in Kosovo. That report
is available at the Balkans Task Force website
2. According to the Yugoslavian Ministry of Environmental Protection, BBC news, ( April 17).
3. Natural areas in Kosovo were not visited because KFOR, the NATO force in Kosovo, warned against the presence of uncleared minefields and unexploded ordnance.
4. Although there are strong indications that depleted uranium ammunition was used-for example, from a U.S. Department of Defense media briefing on May 3, 1999-it is assumed that NATO does not want to share any information on the use of depleted uranium because of the ongoing court cases on the claimed health effects of the use of depleted uranium in the Gulf War.
5. The Balkans Task Force was told that the biggest problem in Nis at present is the mental state of the people, after so many nights of continuous bombings. Reportedly, all sorts of mental illnesses are emerging and the number of suicides has increased sharply.
6. Some sources say that this is because the industries used the bombings to get rid of their stored wastes. Others say it was caused by leaking factories destroyed by the bombings. The Balkans Task Force did not find any evidence for the first statement.
7. During the assessment, we drove past a few military sites, and as observed from the road, those were completely destroyed. We also saw a field full of parked tanks, trucks, and artillery. Obviously, the Yugoslavian military has been successful in hiding some of its equipment from NATO bombs.
8. UNEP, according to its mandate, is not involved in field activities and projects. UNEP is a policy-oriented organization focusing on environmental assessment and support to and promotion of the building of environmental policies at all levels. UNEP also does not have the capacity to execute field projects worldwide. Within the UN system, the United Nations Development Programme is the agency with country offices worldwide, supporting UN field projects. UNEP also has a country office in Belgrade.
