



# Water Marketing: Obstacles and Opportunities

*New market-based management strategies may prompt conservation and lead to higher-value uses of water resources.*

BY KENNETH D. FREDERICK

**F**reshwater is a scarce and often threatened resource throughout much of the United States, but particularly in the arid West. Supplies are being depleted or degraded by unsustainable rates of groundwater use, contamination, and damage to aquatic ecosystems. Meanwhile, demands for water are rising with an expanding population, higher incomes, and a growing appreciation for the services and amenities provided by streams, lakes, and other aquatic resources. But the options for increasing supplies are expensive relative to current water prices and are often environmentally damaging.

Providing for increasing water demands requires changes in how water

has traditionally been managed and allocated among competing uses. There is a growing consensus that greater reliance on economic principles in managing and allocating water is critical for more efficient and sustainable use.

More than a quarter century

ago, the U.S. National Water Commission's *Final Report to the President and to the Congress* made a strong case for facilitating voluntary water transfers to promote a more-efficient allocation of scarce water resources and to curb the perceived need for additional wa-

ter supply projects.<sup>1</sup> In 1992, the International Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin and the Earth Summit in Rio both endorsed viewing water as an economic good. Introducing economic incentives was also one of the core recommendations of the World Bank policy paper on *Water Resource Management* prepared that same year.<sup>2</sup>

In 2000, the World Commission on Water for the 21st Century concluded that we are on a path toward a water crisis and that business as usual is unsustainable.<sup>3</sup> The commission's proposals for changing course include recognizing that water is a scarce resource and that we need to manage it accordingly.

## Water Markets

**M**arkets and prices play a role in allocation of resources among competing uses, and they provide incentives to conserve and invest in new supplies. In a competitive economy, price adjustments and market transfers keep supply and demand in balance. Prices rise when demand increases faster than supply. Higher prices provide incentives to use less, to produce more, and to develop and adopt technologies that conserve use and increase output. Markets enable resources to move from lower to higher-value uses as conditions change. For example, water traditionally used for irrigation may be more valuable as a municipal water source as the demands of a nearby urban center increase.

Tradable water rights potentially can encourage conservation and a more economically efficient allocation of scarce water resources. Currently, water is underpriced and often allocated based on institutions established when water was not considered to be a scarce resource. Users pay nothing for the water itself. Municipal and industrial users typically pay a fee reflecting the costs of storing, delivering, and treating water supplies. But even these costs are likely to be subsidized for irrigation, which commonly represents a region's largest water use. Without an opportunity to sell unused supplies, irrigators have little incentive to conserve water. With the introduction of tradable water rights, however, users value water in terms of its opportunity cost—the value they could get by selling water—rather than at the subsidized price they pay for it.

In spite of their potential benefits and growing popularity, mar-

ket forces have been slow to adapt to the reality of water scarcity. Efficient markets require well-defined, transferable property rights, and the full costs and benefits of a transfer must be borne by the buyers and sellers. Both the nature of the resource and the institutions that manage and allocate water can make it difficult to meet these conditions.

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### Obstacles

**T**he variability of water supplies in time and space creates problems for establishing clear property rights. Driven by energy from the sun, water constantly evaporates from seas, lakes, and streams or transpires from plants, entering the atmosphere, then returning to earth through precipitation. Precipitation that is not quickly evaporated or transpired back to the atmosphere is the source of a region's renewable water supplies. This water flows into lakes, rivers, groundwater reservoirs, and eventually the ocean, unless it is first withdrawn for use.

Three basic systems—riparian rights, prior appropriation rights, and public permits—have developed for establishing rights to this water.

**Riparian rights.** The common law system of riparian rights gives owners of the lands bordering a water body use of the water in ways that do not unduly inconvenience other riparian owners. Riparian rights have origins in the earliest legal systems establishing private

ownership of land. They continue to provide the basis of water law in many areas, including some arid Moslem and humid European countries and the eastern United States. These rights are poorly defined because shortages are shared by all riparian owners and use is subject to regulatory or judicial interpretation as to what is reasonable or might unduly inconvenience others.

**Appropriative rights.** Constraints on transferring water to non-riparian lands and uncertainties such as how much water a riparian owner can use are obstacles to applying riparian rights in areas where streams are fewer and flows are smaller and less reliable. Consequently, in the arid and semi-arid western United States, riparian rights were abandoned in favor of water rights based on prior appropriation. Prior appropriation rights, which have been adapted by all 17 western states, have three principal features:

- Water rights are established by withdrawing water from its natural source and putting it to a beneficial use, such as irrigation. Unlike the owner of riparian rights, the party appropriating water does not have to be a riparian landowner, and the water does not have to be used on riparian lands.
- During periods of shortage, water is allocated according to the

principle of “first in time, first in right.” Thus, junior appropriators receive no water until senior appropriators—those with the oldest rights—have received their full allotment.

■ Failure to use water for some period of time results in loss of the right. This provision creates a use-it-or-lose-it incentive, encouraging withdrawal even when the water

place or use to another will commonly affect third parties—those other than the buyer and seller. When a farmer sells—in effect, transfers—water to a city, the economic base of the water-exporting community may decline. And when a transfer alters the quantity of water in a stream, other stream users are likely to be affected. Indeed, changes in flow affect the

ignored. On the other side are the more-recently empowered stakeholders armed with legislation designed to protect and restore environmental and recreational uses.

While domestic, industrial, and agricultural users may compete for the water diverted from streams and reservoirs, all three groups vie with environmentalists and recreationists over the amount that can be withdrawn. Conflicts also arise over the priority that dam operators give to flood control, water supplies, hydropower production, fish habitat, and recreational opportunities. Without markets and prices to guide allocation of water and guide dam and reservoir management, conflicts are often played out in the courts or administrative proceedings.

Groundwater initially was treated as a resource that landowners could capture at will. But groundwater is often a common property resource that flows from one property to another until captured for use. Pumping can adversely affect third parties. One party’s pumping can reduce the water available to neighboring water users, forcing them to pump from greater depths and lowering their well yields. Third parties may also be harmed if groundwater use reduces surface flows, causes salt-water intrusion into an aquifer, or results in the collapse of lands above underground aquifers that have been at least partially drained.

The emergence of such impacts, along with improved knowledge of the links between ground and surface water, have led to restrictions on groundwater use. In the western United States, for instance, most states have adopted some form of a permit system for groundwater. But even in states lacking a permit system—such as Texas, which contin-

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contributes little if any value to the user.

Appropriative rights encourage the depletion of waters in a stream. Until recently, such instream flows lacked protection under state water laws. Unlike riparian rights, appropriative rights can be transferable, but sales are commonly restricted as to how and where water can be used.

**Public permits.** Riparian and appropriative water rights initially were acquired without state interference. But as supplies become scarcer, governments are assuming a more active role in controlling water use. Some form of a permit system now governs use of at least some water in virtually every country.<sup>4</sup>

In principle, water permits can be auctioned by governments and bought and sold in private markets. In practice, however, permits are usually free, and transfers are limited by the nature of the right as well as by the infrastructure available to store and transport water.

Transferring water from one

amenities and recreational opportunities that rivers and lakes provide, as well as the individuals who enjoy them. Generally, these water services are public goods that are not marketed, because the public cannot be excluded from freely enjoying them. Thus when marketing water, the private sector tends to ignore the impacts of water transfers on the public goods the waters produce. Similarly, polluters underinvest in waste reduction and treatment when the costs of using water bodies for waste disposal are borne by society rather than the individual polluter.

During the past three decades, water-related investments and legislation in the United States have been driven largely by a desire to protect the resource and the public benefits it provides. The resulting environmental legislation and regulations have contributed to uncertainties over water rights. On one side are the traditional users with rights established when water was treated as a free resource and environmental impacts were

ues to grant landowners unrestricted rights to pump groundwater without liability for damages inflicted on others—landowners overlying a defined aquifer may voluntarily form a conservation district to regulate wells.

### Opportunities

**T**he absence of markets and market-based prices to allocate scarce supplies and guide water managers has resulted in large differences in the value of water among alternative uses. For example, most of the water rights in the western United States are held by farmers and irrigation districts, which pay only the modest cost of having water delivered to their farms. As a result, large quantities of water are applied liberally to relatively low-value crops. In some cases, simply leaving more water in the river to provide hydropower, recreation, and fish and wildlife habitat might increase the total value of the water to society. Similarly, selling water to urban areas that otherwise would invest in costly and often environmentally damaging water-supply projects might boost water values by an order of magnitude or more in some cases.<sup>5</sup>

Large differences in the value of water among alternative uses provide powerful incentives to overcome obstacles to transfers. As a result, water marketing is becoming common and increasingly innovative in several countries. A variety of market arrangements have emerged in the western United States to accommodate and respond to short-term fluctuations in supply and demand stemming from climate variability or other factors. These include leases, op-

tions to purchase water during dry periods, and water banking. The temporary nature of such transfers blunts a principal third-party concern that a transfer will undermine the economic and social viability of the water-exporting area.

Farmers with senior appropriative rights who grow annual crops might profit by selling an option to use some of their water during

objective of a water bank is to bring together those who want to purchase water with those who are interested in selling their entitlements.

The bank provides several key functions. It determines which water use entitlements may be banked and the quantity of water associated with each entitlement. It determines who can rent or buy

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a drought and leaving some or all of their fields fallow. Growers threatened with the loss of long-term investments in orchards, or cities facing rationing, are able to more than compensate these farmers for losses incurred from temporarily leaving some of their lands fallow.

Such transfers among farmers within the same irrigation district are common and often relatively easy to arrange. But cities seeking to transfer water away from an irrigation district are likely to encounter greater institutional obstacles and financial costs.

### Water Banks

**W**ater banks represent one solution to these obstacles. Water banks are designed to facilitate water transfers in response to short-term changes in supply and demand conditions. They enable the owner of a permanent water right to sell all or part of one year's entitlement. Thus, the entitlement is, in effect, leased or rented but not permanently transferred. The primary

water, and it sets the rental rules. The bank may also determine how much water can be transferred without injury to third parties. Once the rules are established, the bank operates like a broker, accepting valid water use entitlements for deposit and making them available to those hoping to obtain water at a lower cost than they would otherwise have to pay.<sup>6</sup>

■ **California.** A temporary federal water bank administered by the Bureau of Reclamation and endowed with federal funds was established in California during the 1976-77 drought to provide for water transfers within the agricultural sector.<sup>7</sup> Then, in 1991, California established an emergency water bank in the fifth year of a prolonged drought, after legislative attempts to promote private transfers produced few transactions. The bank, which reallocated water among willing buyers and sellers, operated in 1991, 1992, and 1994. Initially, the bank purchased water for \$125 per acre-foot (about 10.1 cents per cubic meter) and sold it for \$175 an acre-foot plus delivery charges. In some

cases, the delivery charges exceeded the initial cost of the water.<sup>8</sup>

Purchases by the bank proceeded slowly until the state guaranteed sellers that their price would be adjusted upward to reflect subsequent seasonal price increases. Farmers willing to idle land or shift from diverting surface water to pumping groundwater were the principal sellers. The bank pur-

transfers of water rights, but rules governing where and how the water can be used are restrictive. For instance, out-of-state transfers are prohibited and irrigators receive preference over all other users in purchasing or renting banked water.

■ **Australia.** In Australia, the state of Victoria, which facilitates transfers, defines water rights as explicit

for adapting to the long-term demand and supply shifts that result from population and income growth, urbanization, rising values for instream flows, groundwater depletion, and climate change. Indeed, at some point, as supply and demand conditions change, the historical allocation of water rights becomes inefficient enough to warrant a permanent transfer of rights.

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chased 800,000 acre-feet (nearly 1 billion cubic meters) of water, based on early estimates of critical need before the buyers made firm commitments.

California incurred a sizable financial loss when the bank was able to resell only about half of the water. Unsold water was used primarily for carryover storage and for reducing saltwater intrusion into the delta of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers.

In subsequent years, the state required a signed contract with a buyer before committing to purchase water.<sup>9</sup> The third-party impacts associated with these transfers are unknown, but they were probably insignificant compared with the benefits of moving water to higher-value uses during a period of severe drought.

■ **Idaho.** Idaho established the nation's first permanent water-banking program in 1979, and several western states are considering similar actions. Idaho's bank allows temporary or permanent

shares of stored, rather than delivered, water. Under this system of capacity sharing, decisions regarding reservoir releases are made by individual owners of the rights rather than by a central authority. Reservoir operators serve like bankers, making releases on request. The operators also keep track of each owner's balance on a continuous basis by adding inflows and deducting releases and losses from evaporation and seepage. Water users control the timing of their deliveries, and transfers can be made simply by having the operator make the appropriate debit and credit.<sup>10</sup>

Banks can operate at any administrative level, ranging from multi-state to water districts to ditch companies. They can be designed to manage different types of water-use entitlements. And they can facilitate temporary water transfers by developing clear, well-defined rules and procedures that reduce transaction costs.

Temporary water transfers, however, are not particularly effective

## Keeping Deserts Green

**T**ransfers of permanent water rights are permitted, subject to review of third-party considerations, in all the western U.S. states. The process of resolving third-party impacts is often slow, costly, and contentious, however, and the outcome of a proposed transfer can be uncertain. Those orchestrating the proposed transfers face either the challenge of proving that a change will not harm others or the added cost of compensating the third parties who might be adversely affected by the transfer.

Ongoing efforts to meet the water demands of the rapidly growing coastal area of southern California illustrate the challenges of securing additional water in a region where supplies are already fully developed and allocated. The task is made more urgent and difficult because access to some of the region's traditional sources has been blocked.

As a result of environmental concerns, for instance, Los Angeles has been forced to reduce the water it takes from Mono Lake and Owens Valley. The region is also losing rights to the unused entitlements of other states to water from the Colorado River.

The Imperial Irrigation District

(IID), in the southeastern corner of California, owns senior rights to much of California's share of the Colorado River. To help meet the growing demands of the state's southern coastal region, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) agreed in 1989 to invest approximately \$115 million, plus about \$3 million annually for operation and maintenance, to conserve water in the irrigation district through such measures as lining canals to prevent water loss through seepage. In exchange, the MWD acquired the rights to about 100,000 acre-feet of conserved water per year.<sup>11</sup> More recently, San Diego—which depends on, but has a low priority claim to, MWD water supplies—agreed to fund additional conservation investments in the IID in return for conserved water.

These agreements illustrate the opportunities and obstacles associated with using market forces to reallocate water. In these cases, water was transferred from relatively inefficient, low-value agricultural uses to higher-value urban uses; IID's agricultural base was preserved through conservation investments; and the interests of neighboring U.S. irrigation districts were protected.

Yet concluding these apparent win-win arrangements required nearly five years of often contentious negotiations among the participants and interested third parties.

Moreover, agreement in this instance was facilitated because the participants were able to ignore the adverse third-party impacts in Mexico. Indeed, before the canals were lined, some of the water seeping out of them had helped recharge groundwater aquifers used

by Mexican farmers just across the international border. These third-party impacts were ignored because the Mexicans had no recognized legal claim to the water.

Efforts to arrange interstate sales of Colorado River water have been less successful. The 1922 Colorado River Compact among seven western states divided the river equally between the upper basin states

Las Vegas—which already uses most of Nevada's entitlement to the Colorado River—is currently seeking more water. Meanwhile, it lacks rights to surplus flows, and depletion of its groundwater is causing subsidence within the city. Unused upper-basin entitlements to the Colorado River are a logical source of additional supply, and Utah appears to be a willing seller.

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(Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) and the lower basin states (Arizona, California, and Nevada). The upper basin states have never fully used their entitlements. The MWD therefore has been able to take the unused water for free. California, however, is being required to cut back on its use of these surplus flows, and the upper basin states are seeking opportunities to benefit from their full entitlements.

The potential for mutually profitable transfers from the underused upper to the overused lower basin has stimulated several proposed sales. In the 1980s, the Galloway Group, a Colorado corporation with claims to 1.3 million acre-feet of Colorado River water, proposed constructing reservoirs to produce hydropower and store water for leasing to Arizona and southern California. San Diego paid \$10,000 for an option to lease 300,000 to 500,000 acre-feet per year for 40 years, but the project died under a flood of unresolved legal issues.<sup>12</sup>

But consummating this or any other water transfer between the two basins could require renegotiation of the 1922 compact.

Transfers among the lower basin states encounter fewer legal hurdles but, because of their similar hydrology, offer fewer economic benefits than do transfers between the upper and lower basins. In 1997, the U.S. Department of Interior issued a ruling designed to encourage and facilitate voluntary transactions among the three lower-basin states. Arizona has established a Water Banking Authority to purchase its own unused entitlements for storage in groundwater basins and possible sale to California and Nevada. But the opportunities for profitable water transfers among these three states—each of which is trying to meet the demands of rapidly growing metropolitan areas—pale in comparison to the potential benefits of transfers to the lower basin from the upper basin, with its large quantities of unused entitlements.

### Colorado-Big Thompson

The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation's Colorado-Big Thompson project has been cited as a prime example of efficient water marketing. The project involves a series of reservoirs to capture part of the flow of the Colorado River and its tributaries. An average of 230,000

acre-feet of water annually is transferred through a tunnel from the western slopes of the Rocky Mountains to the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District in northeastern Colorado. Rights to proportional shares of this water are freely traded, unencumbered by third-party concerns, within the district. But limiting sales to within the conservancy district precludes even more-profitable transactions that might take place with buyers outside the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District. For example, the right to an acre-foot of water in perpetuity has sold for \$3,500 more in the neighboring Denver suburbs than in the conservancy district.<sup>13</sup>

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acre-feet of water annually is transferred through a tunnel from the western slopes of the Rocky Mountains to the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District in northeastern Colorado. Rights to proportional shares of this water are freely traded, unencumbered by third-party concerns, within the district.

Under western law, downstream users generally own rights to the return flows of upstream users, and transfers must take account of downstream impacts. But since Colorado-Big Thompson water originates in another basin, the district has retained ownership of the return flow of the diverted water. This arrangement does not eliminate third-party impacts, but it does eliminate the need to consider them in transfer decisions.

In this case, the benefits of being able to transfer water readily among agricultural, municipal, and industrial users within the district are likely much greater than the costs of ignoring the third-party impacts.

### Chile Waters

Chile, which has embraced market economy principles for the last quarter century, has introduced measures to encourage water marketing. In 1981, the nation separated water rights from land ownership and made these rights freely transferable. Views differ as to the extent and benefits of the water markets that emerged in response to these changes. One view holds that Chile's water markets function effectively; water moves from lower to higher value uses, prices are responsive to temporary as well as longer-term scarcity, and trading is active.<sup>14</sup>

A less-optimistic view holds that transfers of water rights separate from land ownership are uncommon, involve only a small percentage of users, and result in little actual reallocation of supplies. In particular, several factors are cited as inhibiting sales of water rights separate from land ownership. These include the inflexibility of

the existing canal systems for distributing water, uncertainty as to who actually owns the water rights, a rural culture that believes water should not be bought and sold separately from land, and slow and erratic administrative procedures designed to protect third-parties from injury.<sup>15</sup>

### Sustainable Management

A consensus is growing that sustainable economic development depends on treating water as a scarce resource and using economic principles to guide its management and allocation. Water markets are a means of introducing these principles and allocating supplies in response to changing supply-and-demand conditions. But marketing water differs in important ways from the sales of most goods and services. The fugitive nature of the resource, the variety of services it provides, and interdependence among users limit the potential for efficient water marketing. Additional constraints result from the laws, regulations, and treaties that establish rights to water and limit how it can be used.

Water resources within a basin—precipitation, runoff, water in lakes and streams, and groundwater—are interrelated. Water users become increasingly interdependent as supplies become scarcer. Dams, reservoirs, canals, pumps, and levees make water availability less dependent on the vicissitudes of the hydrologic cycle and more dependent on human decisions. This infrastructure broadens the opportunities for allocating supplies and generates new demands on the resource.

Reservoir operations affect a variety of water uses, such as flood

control, hydropower production, recreation, fish and wildlife habitat, navigation, water quality, and domestic, industrial, and agricultural water supplies. Allocating reservoir capacity for one use affects other users within the hydrologic system. Drawing down a reservoir for flood control, for example, may reduce available supplies when they are most valued for irrigation, hydropower production, navigation, or recreation.

Managing these reservoirs in a way that best serves society is a daunting challenge. In smaller river valleys where water uses are limited, capacity sharing, as practiced in Victoria, Australia, is a way of defining marketable water rights. In a larger, more complex system, the interdependence among users is too great to ignore. Market allocation of water or reservoir capacity in such a system would be inefficient and chaotic.

While markets are not a panacea for achieving efficient and sustainable water use, they can play an important role in achieving these goals under some circumstances. Water markets, whether formal or informal, have a long history of facilitating transfers. Chile and the western United States, two areas where marketing is most advanced, illustrate both the opportunities and limitations of water markets. Water marketing in these countries has largely involved transfers from relatively low-value, inefficient irrigation use to higher-value domestic and industrial uses. Moreover, the sales often provide incentives and funds for water-conserving investments to protect the economic base of the water-exporting community.

Geography and institutional factors, however, have restricted

development of water markets. Moving water outside of its natural channels is costly and subject to economies of scale. Chile's rivers flow from the Andes to the ocean in a series of small, steep-gradient rivers separated by hills. Consequently, it is expensive to move water from one watershed to another or from downstream to upstream areas within the same basin.<sup>16</sup> The frustrated efforts to sell water rights from the upper to the lower Colorado River basins illustrate how institutional factors can limit potentially profitable transfers even where the infrastructure is in place to move water at low cost. The successes and failures in transferring water emphasize that clearly defined, transferable rights are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for market transactions.

Once transferable rights are established, the most important challenge for creating efficient water markets is developing procedures for expeditiously and fairly handling third-party impacts. Unfortunately, these impacts are not always obvious or quantifiable. Both Chile and the United States allow transfers subject to consideration of these impacts. But the judicial and administrative procedures used to assess these impacts and compensate third parties often impose a high hurdle for prospective buyers.

In spite of the obstacles, the potential gains of transferring water for new uses are encouraging the development of water marketing in many areas. The incentives for voluntary water transfers are strong and will continue to grow as the resource becomes scarcer and the costs of providing water for traditional uses increase.

## A Hot Future

Global warming would likely add to the potential benefits of water transfers. A warming world would alter the hydrologic system and increase the demand for water.

The magnitude, timing, and even direction of climate-induced changes in a region's water supplies are uncertain. The costs of building dams, reservoirs, and canals in anticipation of these uncertain changes are high. But re-examining reservoir operating rules, relaxing constraints on water use, and developing institutions to encourage voluntary exchanges of water through markets would create a system more efficient and able to adapt to whatever the future might bring.<sup>17</sup> ■

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